Our account's proof broke the same rule at the same entry point as commit 69, which came first: recorded with its own proof, never paid, and its bond returned.
DuplicateLowZero-knowledge proofpracticelive · updates as it settles
Program
Program 13Practice program — a tutorial (testnet)practice
On the practice program: our deliberately vulnerable tutorial, open to anyone with no account. Its payouts are testnet wNEAR, with no value. Try it yourself
0.001 wNEAR stays reserved: if a later round's fix stops the earlier claim but not this proof, it proves a distinct bug and is promoted, paid at its original priority.
By a visitor's practice try (v061resume.practice.antibody.testnet), committed (31.0 min before this one). Commit order is priority: the first proof of a key is the one paid.
paid 0.001 wNEARnear-antibody recorded it as the earlier claim in AvhexbJ7…
The sealed proof went to the enclave, in a request near-antibody built from its own records (request sha256 beb18690be17…, request sha256: beb18690be1756bc649dcee124b8ccbc9317e283354326b82b143c38db181c19). The run was paid for by the project (antibody.testnet).
antibody try and this site seal a practice try under a public content key, so anyone can open it; a try sealed another way, or before that key existed, used a random one. The check below tells which. A duplicate is never wrapped for the project; at disclosure it opens with the claim it duplicates.
Three levels, each a check you can run yourself. The first two decide payouts; the zero-knowledge proof sits beside them.
Enclave verdictreached
What the enclave answered
OutLayer's operator delivered the enclave's output to near-antibody: Violation, receipt 4289a52656af…, receipt sha256: 4289a52656afe36e3ddb8c01c776f00325274db40a0e15f6036b9a940913390b. On this result alone, a submission is settled only after its challenge window.
equal: same rule, same tagEqual tags: the same rule broken through the same entry point. That is all a tag says; a different bug behind the same entry point shows up at the fix (rounds).
A tag is a keyed hash of the rule and the entry point, under the program's key, which only the enclave holds.
OutLayer's attestation names the pinned verifier wasm and the sha256 of the request near-antibody sent and of the output it received; NEAR's DCAP verifier accepted the run's Intel TDX quote over it. Instant payouts need it.
Holds if: the run is attested: its quote was verified on NEAR
Zero-knowledge proofconfirmed on NEAR
A zero-knowledge proof of the verdict
near-t2 verified an SP1 proof that the verifier, re-run on the enclave's exact input, gives the enclave's receipt, kind and rules, and compared every bound value with near-antibody's records. It claims no privacy (anyone can open the proof it re-runs: disclosed, or under a published or public content key), and no payout depends on it.
4289a52656af…, the proof's receipt sha256: 4289a52656afe36e3ddb8c01c776f00325274db40a0e15f6036b9a940913390b
equals the enclave's
Kind
Violation
equals the enclave's
Slots (severity)
0 low
equals the enclave's
A different request, run, blob, base, manifest, anchor, program, verifier or severity is rejected outright; a different receipt, kind or slots is recorded as a contradiction.