Testnet: tokens have no value, and the vulnerable contracts are our own test fixtures. Limits

Acme Lend drill 2026-11-08

Acme Lend: our deliberately vulnerable fixtureExitedround 0light-client confirmed
Acme Lend is our deliberately vulnerable fixture: a fictional lending protocol whose planted bugs are textbook classes, labelled in its code. Nothing here is a finding in a real protocol, and wNEAR on testnet has no value.

Overview

The program as near-antibody stores it. Its manifest hash commits the anchor, the targets, the rules and the terms; once it is open, the deployment's owner can change nothing it depends on.
Project
acme.antibody.testnet, account: acme.antibody.testnet · our fixture project
Description
An automated daily drill on a fresh Acme Lend instance (DELIBERATELY VULNERABLE TEST FIXTURE): the one moment, run again.
as written in the committed manifest
Program key
bounty.antibody.testnet/9, program key: bounty.antibody.testnet/9
Phase
Exited round 0this round since
Created
2KKA8ZWc…, NEAR transaction: 2KKA8ZWcCokwhkf4xJWM6YY7qR3XwAnwhQ8DmkGNmD59, opens an explorer in a new tab
Opened
8bZKXXGN…, NEAR transaction: 8bZKXXGNLm8f9UtJSWpGf4L84Z2uiw49h2gupjDdHs8D, opens an explorer in a new tab
Terms sha256
3a9c40175b7ae46a…, terms sha256: 3a9c40175b7ae46a342566111ba65ca4a420c8ff2289eb7b08c8759b5125a34d
Manifest sha256
1758145e17b16fca…, manifest sha256: 1758145e17b16fca5a03ba6369c8ee71d01b3e965acd444a5c946b7e837038a2Uploaded in NEAR transaction HFmgUNTK7H…, NEAR transaction: HFmgUNTK7H59EJvDHKVShACmVkyETkdDYD59KE1k5qKM, opens an explorer in a new tab by acme.antibody.testnet
Sealing key
444f6fd44534d541…, sealing public key: 444f6fd44534d541468a6be7ab5c8809a6ebae4204c104b384ddc8fa19ef6764Proofs are sealed to it. It counts only once its activation run (run 70) is attested on NEAR: 5LTufK5M…, NEAR transaction: 5LTufK5MiEQBxbGrNLnPpDbxUtt1dHW5cb8APPr5gFRp, opens an explorer in a new tab

Its record

At stake
0wNEAR available now
Verified attempts
1
Paid findings
1
First claim
163 safter it opened
Claimed in the first hour
25%of the escrow
Open for
38.5 h
view bounty.antibody.testnet.get_program({"program_id":9})

Holds if: the manifest hash shown here, as near-antibody stores it

antibody judge --program 9

The rules as code

Each rule is one bit of the program's invariants contract. After a proof's calls, at the anchor, the verifier runs its check(): a set bit is a broken rule, paid by its severity. The verifier never reads a report.
The program's rules
RuleSeverityPayoutBudget per roundSource
solvencybit 0an attested proof pauses

Lender claims are covered at the committed reference price.

Critical
0.1 wNEAR
0.4 wNEAR
fees_to_treasurybit 1

Accrued fees plus the treasury balance never decrease.

High
0.03 wNEAR
0.4 wNEAR
share_pricebit 2

The vault's share price never falls for the remaining holders.

Medium
0.01 wNEAR
0.4 wNEAR

The budget caps what one rule pays per round, so many entry points into one root cause cannot drain the escrow. A finding's key is the rule and the entry point that broke it (by default, the target and function): the first proof of each key is paid.

The targets (9) on Sepolia

The terms

Committed in the manifest with the rules, their text fixed by the terms sha256, and enforced by near-antibody: no person decides a payout.

Payouts

The payout table
SeverityPayoutRules
Critical0.1 wNEARsolvency
High0.03 wNEARfees_to_treasury
Medium0.01 wNEARshare_price
Lownonenone
Bond per commit
0.001 wNEAR · refunded, or forfeited to this program's escrow when the proof breaks nothing
Instant payments
up to 0.1 wNEAR
When a payout is instant

Paid in seconds when the verdict is attested on NEAR, within 0.15 wNEAR per 1 h. Otherwise a payout waits the challenge window; above the cap it also needs an agreeing second run.

Challenge bond
0.005 wNEAR
Protocol fee
none · pinned at 0 for this program
Release fee
none · pinned at 0 for this program
Verification deposit
0.03 NEAR per run, paid by whoever asks for it; OutLayer refunds the unused part

The escrow against the largest payout

0×below the largest payout
0 available / 0.1 wNEAR largest

The available escrow over the largest payout. Below 1× the status page raises an alert; a payout the escrow cannot cover is queued as debt, in commit order.

Pauses
An attested proof of solvency, on a light-client anchor, pauses the protocol on every chain the project registered (one pause ticket per round), with no minimum impact.
Known issues
At most 4, sealed before open, their base payouts at most 50% of the escrow.
Gap lane
A proof that breaks no rule but harms a declared protected account by more than $100 is refunded and recorded as a gap claim, with 0.01 wNEAR reserved. It is paid if a later round adds a rule its proof breaks.
Unevaluable
A proof the rules cannot evaluate (check() reverts or runs out of gas) is refunded.

The windows

The program's windows
WindowLengthWhat it bounds
Reveal
10 min
A commit is revealed within this, or it expires and its bond goes to the escrow.
Challenge window
60 s
A verdict that is not paid instantly is final after this; anyone may challenge it within it, with the challenge bond.
Resolve
5 min
A challenge with no attested result within this voids the verdict; both bonds are refunded.
Run timeout
4 min
A run that never answered is void after this.
Infrastructure grace
10 min
An infrastructure failure is retried this long, then the commit closes with a refund.
Round minimum
2 min
A round runs at least this long before the next one opens.
Re-run window
10 min
Re-runs at a proposed fix may be asked for within this of its confirmed check.
Disclosure delay
10 min
A paid proof becomes public at most this long after its claim.
Exit grace
60 s
After the deadline plus this, anyone may settle the program (exit).
Deadline
No commit is accepted after it.

The anchor

Every proof runs on the state proven at one block. A pause ticket, and the verdict guard, act only on an anchor the light client confirmed: on a project-attested anchor a verdict is about state the project chose.
Chain
Sepolia (11155111)
Block
12087672 (opens an explorer)
Hash
0xd250f207b069cadbc5c653f20f96129433357c549ce8f90159f7aa95bb77fe36
Its check
confirmed by the light clientnear-antibody compared the hash with client-eth2.sepolia.testnet when the program was created.anchor_checked (LightClient): 2KKA8ZWc…, NEAR transaction: 2KKA8ZWcCokwhkf4xJWM6YY7qR3XwAnwhQ8DmkGNmD59, opens an explorer in a new tab
Base witness
The anchor state the rules and the round-0 checks read, proven against the anchor and pinned at activation.9e67018e7b725087…, base witness sha256: 9e67018e7b725087ecb4450a794e81ab3e20d5996af092076b03a43b83c93c4dUploaded in NEAR transaction EzANHWoXXV…, NEAR transaction: EzANHWoXXVqiEisciyH2Ns1qcd8AUe6cHpbYwTqdKWxR, opens an explorer in a new tab by acme.antibody.testnet

Check the hash yourself

view client-eth2.sepolia.testnet.block_hash_safe(12087672 as 8 little-endian bytes: 0x7871b80000000000)

Expected: byte 0 is 1 (the client holds the block), then 32 bytes equal to the anchor hash.

The same check from a terminal, and the one that also hashes the block header from a Sepolia RPC:

antibody judge --program 9
antibody anchor-check --block 12087672

Known issues

Declared sealed before open; a later proof with the same tag is not paid again. Their count, rules and severities are public; their content stays sealed for good.
0 sealed
No known issue declared: every key this program prices was open to the first proof.

The chains

Per chain: the program's adapter, the proxies it may pause or upgrade, and every permit near-guardian asked the MPC network to sign, with the transaction that carried it there.
Reading the chains…

The sealed feed

Every commit in order: who, when, the state, the verdict and the payout; never the proof. A proof stays sealed until disclosure, and the project reads only the proofs it pays for.
Zero-knowledge proofs: none yet
The sealed feed, in commit order
CommitWhoWhenStateVerdictKeysPayout
Commit 35#0 · round 0
Paid
ViolationAttested on NEAR
solvencyf27ef261…, tag of solvency: f27ef2619b5207bffc2d5b34d0476b8e4cdf60fe6884c20d357774a5c3bfc4f6

A key is a rule and the entry point that broke it: the first proof of each key is paid; a later one is a duplicate that keeps its own proof record. Each commit's page shows its proof card and how to check it.

antibody status --program 9

Rounds and the release gate

A round ships a fix as code overrides at the same anchor. The enclave checks it, every paid proof is re-run against it, and a release permit is signed only for code that every paid proof fails against.
No round yet: this program still runs its round-0 code. A round is how a fix ships, and only a fix every paid proof fails against is released.

The ledger

Every movement of the escrow keeps funded equal to available + reserved + paid + fees + returned. Amounts in wNEAR, which has no value on testnet.
balances

Where the escrow is

Available0.000
Reserved0.000
Paid0.100
Fees0.000
Returned0.300
Funded0.400

What came in

Deposits0.400
Forfeited bonds0.000
Challenge bonds0.000
Funded0.400

Forfeited bonds go to this program's escrow, where they pay future findings: never to us.

The audit

Accounted
0.4
Reservations
0 · held by the commits; equals reserved when it balances
Debt
0 · owed and not yet funded, queued in commit order
Defaulted
0
view bounty.antibody.testnet.audit({"program_id":9})

Holds if: ok: true (funded equals accounted, and reserved equals the commits' reservations)

antibody view --contract bounty.antibody.testnet --method audit --args '{"program_id":9}'